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Introduction
In the first article on this subject (IDS Bulletin,
Volume 8 No. 3) it was argued that militarism in the
Third World is closely associated with the expansion
of capital in the world economy. Let us now look at
the violence and armed struggle which has
accompanied this expansion. It is a grim picture. For
the past 30 years the major world powers have been
locked in nuclear stalemate, restrained only by their
fear of a holocaust made increasingly terrifying by
the incessant arms race. The struggles between them
have often been diverted to the periphery where
violent upheavalscoups, revolutions, strikes, com-
munal rioting, civil wars and wars between rival
statesare commonplace. This is a matter for
concern if only because human beings in their
thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands
and millions have been slaughtered in the process:
whether by their own compatriots or ruling classes,
as in Uganda, Argentina, Indonesia or Cambodia; or
by the direct intervention of imperial powers as in
Vietnam. The social and economic costs of violence,
social disruption, warfare and movements of
population on the scale they have occurred in the
Third World over the past three decades are almost
incalculable.
Peace is a realistic programme only if it is sought
through an understanding of the political and
economic forces which create struggles for domi-
nation. The military is a crucial instrument in such
struggles: both as an agent of internal repression and
international domination; and (on the whole less
frequently) of radical social change and national
liberation.
There are two ways of approaching the problems of
peacekeeping. The first is more cautious and
incremental: how, given existing forms of force, of
class conflict, of state and international organisation,
can conflict be averted, arms races be kept under
control and the human and material costs of
international conflict beminimised? The second looks
at things more comprehensively: what transfor-
mations in class structure, military, state and
international organisation would be required to
assure conditions of lasting peace, both nationally
and internationally?
The arguments of this paper suggest that the patterns
of accumulation which prevail in the world economy,
the existing forms of force and the present
organisation of the international system of nation
states, severely limit the scope for international
agreement on arms control and conflict resolution of
the first (incremental) kind. In addition, the present
international system is based on a distribution of
economic resources and of political and military
power that systematically disadvantages the Third
World and which the people of the latter will not for
long be able to accept.
These limits and conflicts are described below. It is a
much more difficult task to suggest alternatives.
What forms of force and of popular mobilisation can
negate the power to coerce professional military
organisations? How can the nexus between
armaments and international capital accumulation
be broken? How can existing international institu-
tions and the prevailing international distribution of
power be changed without precipitating a nuclear
holocaust? This paper does not pretend to give ready
answers.
Military professionalism, class and uneven develop-
ment
Class struggle is endemic in development. But the
form and direction it takes is deflected by the major
fractures within and between social formations
created by uneven development. The expansion of
capital from the capitalist core to the periphery
disrupted the entire social fabric of the latter. Not
only did it destroy old modes of production and
replace them by new international forms of
exploitation, but also it triggered off a series of
political upheavals: war, colonial conquest, na-
tionalism, inter-communal conflict and revolution.
At a national level these conflicts encompass the
struggles between class and class but extend well
beyond them. At international level conflict is
inherent in the existence side by side of states
dominated by different classes and modes of
production, though as the Sino-Soviet split reminds
us this is not the only way international differences
arise. Nationalism is a phenomenon one ignores at
one's peril. Yet it is profoundly contradictory in its
nature. On the one hand it was itself intçrnationalised
by the expansion of the core capitalist countries into
the periphery, providing the ideological charter of
the nation-state, the political form of bourgeois
society par excellence. Nevertheless, nations also
demark major fractures in the international system.
Nationalism was the rallying cry for the dismantling
of colonial empires. In most Third World countries it
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symbolises the revolt of the periphery against the
international centre. It is sustained by an inter-
national stratification between nations in terms of the
power, status and economic resources they com-
mand. And the major revolutions which have taken
place in the Third WorldChina, Vietnam, Cuba,
Mozambique etc.were not only social but also
national, this being a major ingredient in their
success.
The military has a particular role in all this because
of the functions of organised force in carrying out
(and repressing) internal conflict, in international
stratification and in international war and peace-
making. Its institutional format reflects the
contradictions inherent in the international system.
On the one hand it is the most international of
professions. The similarities between military elites,
the brotherhood of arms, the multiple inter-
connections between them created by training and
service abroad might seem to suggest that they are an
important element in a new international class
structure. Yet armies are the instruments of
individual states, have national rather than
international command structures and often develop
strong nationalist ideologies. Their interstitial
position between the nation State and the
international system is critical in reproducing both.
The existing literature on the military in the Third
World fails almost completely, however, to establish
the connections between the military's position in the
class structure, its institutional characteristics and its
international dimensions. Insofar as it deals with the
subject of class at all it does so in terms of the alleged
consequences of the recruitment and social origins of
the officer corps. Officers are either said to be
conservative because they originate from the upper
levels of the class structurean argument that was
popular in the past with radical critics of the
militaryor they are said to be part of the 'new
middle class', which brings about modernisation.
A sophisticated attempt by Huntington (1968,
chapter 4) to synthesise these arguments in terms of
different stages in modernisation postulates that
when middle-class groups begin to challenge
traditional landed oligarchies, the military plays a
progressive role in dislodging the latter; but when
lower class groups begin to organise, the military
increasingly plays a repressive role in defence of
established class interests. The military supports
bourgeois revolutions but opposes socialist ones,
although one could not expect a conservative
American academic to say so in so many words.
No really convincing explanation, however, is given
why the military should be located at some fixed
'middle point' in the class structure. Empirical
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studies of the class origins of army officers in the
Third World on the whole confirm that officers are
neither recruited from the ruling or upper classes-
even in countries like Brazil where the class structure
is relatively well developednor are many of them
Sons of peasants and workers. Few of these studies
demonstrate, however, that class origins have a
significant effect on political behaviour. The
important differences between the military juntas of
Brazil and of Peru, would for example, be impossible
to predict from their class origins, which are
strikingly similar (Stepan, 1973, chapter 2).
Something akin to a process of class formation
occurs in military organisations themselves and is
visible in their tendency to fissure along the
gradations of the military hierarchy. Coups are often
the product of particular officer peer groups with
similar rank, training, career experience and sources
of grievance, such as the Free Officers who brought
the military into power in Egypt; the Eighth
Graduating Class prominent in the Korean coup of
1961; the Majors and Captains and Lieutenants who
staged coup and countercoup in Nigeria in 1966; the
Lieutenants who belonged to the Tenentismo
movement in Brazil in the 1920s and 1930s; and the
Captains and Majors who organised the Portuguese
and Ethiopian military revolutions of 1974. Such
fissures tend to occur precisely because military
organisations are at the same time hierarchies in
which rank and career create shared interest and
experience between officers of similar rank; and
power structures in which the tension between upper
and lower levels of command is difficult to contain.
Most armies reproduce the two class division of
capitalist societies in the cleavage between officers
and the men over whom they exercise command.
Again there are numerous examples of military
revolts from the ranks, some with momentous
political consequences: the sergeants' revolt and
naval mutiny which precipitated the assumption of
power by the officer corps in Brazil in 1964; the East
African mutinies of 1964 which almost (but for
British intervention) destroyed the newly independent
regimes in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and
contributed directly to the rise to power in Uganda of
Amin; the coup of July 1966 in Nigeria which was as
much a revolt of NCOs against the military command
as it was a coup of Northerners against Ibo control of
army and State; the revolt by ordinary soldiers in
Sierra Leone who in 1968 locked up their entire
officer corps and handed power back to civilians; and
the Portuguese and Ethiopian military revolutions of
1974 the organisers of which acted under strong
pressure from their own rank and file (in Ethiopia
ordinary soldiers even put their officers under guard
until they agreed to act on their behalf).
Military structures, in sum, generate cleavages that
resemble class conflict in that they are generated in a
systematic way through the social relations of force;'
by the way men are fitted together in large-scale
organisations around a weapons system designed to
produce a certain 'output' of violence.
Such cleavages make it impossible to assume that the
military is a monolithic institution or that its role is
always conservative. Groups of middle-level and
junior officers have sometimes developed radical
political programmes: (the Tenentismo movement in
Brazil in the 1920s, the Free Officers in Egypt in the
1950s, the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal and
the Derg in Ethiopia in the 1970s).
Revolts from the ranks can be still more
revolutionary in their potential than peer group
interventions. The turning point in the Russian
Revolution of 1917 was when the ordinary soldiers
refused to turn their guns on the striking workers and
joined them. The movements initiated by the Derg in
Ethiopia and the Armed Forces Movement in
Portugal would probably have been less sweeping
without the active pressure and participation of the
military rank and file.
Yet military revolts also tend to provoke reaction by
the hierarchy. Both Nigerian coups of 1966 though
initiated from below, were taken over in the one case
by the military Supreme Commander and in the
other by the most senior Northern officers. Among
the reasons for the Brazilian coup of 1964 was the
officers' alarm that the government had failed to deal
firmly with mutinies which could have threatened the
military institution itself. And what above all
persuaded the army officers finally to divert Portugal
from its revolutionary course in late 1975 was fear of
the consequences of growing indiscipline among the
rank and file. As the then Chief of Staff of the
Portuguese armed forces, General Fabiao, put it in
October 1975, when commenting on the rank and file
organisation, Soldiers United Will Win (SUV), "the
SUV has a certain strength. But I have reservations,
because it is a horizontal organisation and in the
army we have a vertical organisation". (Economist,
1975).
Although the social relations of violence themselves
thus generate impetus both for military radicalism
and for military reaction they are by no means a
sufficient condition of either. The Russian Revolution
was a revolution because soldiers joined the workers
and peasants they were brought out to suppress and
not the other way round. In some circumstances army
revolt may amount to little more than narrow trades
I Though they do not, strictly speaking, arise from the ex-
ploitation of soldiers as. a workforce from which surplus value
is extracted; but from their domination in a hierarchy of
power relationships controlled by their superiors.
unionism being easily suppressed because of the
absence of wide social support or, like the East
African Mutinies of 1964, as a result of external
intervention; bought off by better pay and conditions
of service; or (if successful) turning the army into a
machine for the extortion of tribute by the new
lumpen-militariat as in Amin's Uganda or Batista's
Cuba. For soldiers and officers who rebel against the
hierarchy always have the option of expropriating
the latter for their own benefit rather than seeking
to transform society. They are unlikely to choose (or
indeed think of) the latter unless external class forces
also impel them to do so.
Just as the military is not, because of its institutional
distinctiveness, purely and simply the mailed fist of
the ruling class; so on the other hand military
upheavals cannot by themselves bring about class
transformation unless they are associated with mass
struggle outside the narrow confines of the military
bureaucracy itself. Military revolutions are often
little more than revolutions from above, enhancing
the role of the State rather than transforming
society. The natural heirs of the Tenentismo
movement, for example, are the Brazilian generals of
the 1970s. In Egypt the social transformation
achieved under Nasser was in the final analysis rather
limited and is now being reversed under his successor.
Up to this point I have left out the conflicts of
community, tribe, religion, culture, language and
nation (or sub-nation) which are often also associated
with military upheavals. These are in part the residue
of pre-capitalist social formations. But in their
present form they are as much the product of the
uneven development of capitalism and of the State,
which characteristically incorporates some groups
more fully than others and sets in motion struggles
for scarce state-allocated resourcesbe they jobs,
power, development expenditures or military
recruitment and promotions.
Nowherebecause of the lack of fit between imposed
state superstructures and pre-capitalist formations-
are such conflicts more evident than in sub-Saharan
Africa. Yet in few parts of the Third World can they
be completely ignored. ReligionChristian versus
Moslem as in the Lebanon, Ethiopia and the
Philippines, different Moslem sects as in Syria or the
Sudanrace or tribefor example, military recruit-
ment as a basis of Malay hegemony in Malaysia,
Tutsi repression in Burundi or Bedouin dominance in
Jordanand regionas in the conflict between
sierra and coast in Ecuador or the regional balancing
of power in the Brazilian armyhave all been major
factors in military struggles.
Such cleavages do not obliterate military and class
relations, but interact with them. In my own case
study of The Nigerian Military (Luckham, l971a), I
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took one of the most extreme examples of ethnic and
regional fragmentation of the military and demon-
strated that this could also be accounted for in terms
of the army's organisational cleavages, the social
relations of force. The distribution of power in the
military hierarchy overlapped with regional and
ethnic differences in such a way that ethnicity became
a symbolic master key that unlocked the contra-
dictions of both army and society at the same time in
the two coups which took place in 1966. Depending
on the recruitment base of the military, the
demographic structure and geo-politics of the
country and the nature of uneven development,
several other variations might be theoretically
possible.
The military is also riven by the contradictions
between those forces which hold together the
national class structure and those which link classes
together internationally. Armies are kept in oper-
ation by the international arms trade. Yet the
surpluses with which arms are purchased are appro-
priated nationally. Soldiers fight external wars or at
the very least keep themselves in a state ofpreparation
for them. Yet they are also the agents of internal
repression; indeed in some countries that is virtually
their only function. Professionalism is an inter-
national ideology disseminated by the military
assistance programmes of the advanced countries.
Yet army officers play out their careers in national
military establishments and are not as internationally
mobile as the managers of multinational corpor-
ations.
Military training makes army officers peculiarly
susceptible to international influences. They often
attend courses abroad at some stage in their military
career: Latin American officers for the most part in
the USA or in US-sponsored institutes such as the
inter-American counter-insurgency school in Pana-
ma; English speaking African officers in Britain and
other countries of the Commonwealth like Canada,
Australia, India or Pakistan, but also in the USA:
French speaking Africans in France. Military
academies and training schools are often modelled
on the metropolis, sometimes indirectly as in Nigeria,
where the Military Academy was set up with Indian
advice and technical assistance, thus passing on
British professional values and modes of military
organisation at second remove. The socialist
countries have likewise recognised the importance of
military training for transmitting their international
influence; not only in countries where it supports an
ongoing transition to socialism (Chinese assistance in
the reorganisation of the Tanzanian military or
Cuban training missions in Angola) but also in
countries where such a transition is more remote
(Russian assistance to Uganda and Chinese to the
Angolan FNLA).
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The implications of military training and assistance
programmes for external dependence are easy to see.
They train soldiers in the use of the technologies of
the donor countries. They give sustenance to the
social relations of force around which the
professional armies of both metropolis and periphery
are organised. They create networks of professional
contacts both with metropolitan military institutions
and among course-mates in different peripheral
countries. And they are often explicitly intended, like
US counterinsurgency courses, (or indeed Chinese
guerrilla instruction) to promote the political
philosophy and interests of the country which
provides the training.
They also transmit into the Third World elements of
the major class contradictions of the advanced
capitalist societies. On the one hand military
professionalism means mastery of a range of skills-
of management, of using, maintaining and control-
ling weapons, of technology, communication and
transportdeveloped in parallel with the expansion
of capitalism. At the same time these technical and
managerial elements of professionalism are in
tension with its heroic elements. The latter are a
residue of feudalism, but continue to play a critical
role in modern armies because they legitimise the
military hierarchy.2 Thus even these feudal elements
are transmitted into the Third World. Pomp and
circumstance and the notion that 'officers are
gentlemen' seem to be universal aspects of military
culture be it in Thailand, Zambia or El Salvador.
The officer and gentlemen ethic is often used to
create a special niche for the military in the national
class structure. In Nigeria, for example, (Luckham
1971a chapter 4) it is used to assert a distinctive
military sphere of values in which social status is not
allocated in accordance with the criterion of
educational achievement which prevails among other
elites (and according to which army officers measure
up poorly). The officer corps is thus set apart from
the class structure as a whole, yet articulated with it,
corresponding with the military's interstitial position
both as the mailed fist of the dominant class or
classes and as that part of the state superstructure
which holds a national society together in periods of
class conflict or international crisis.
The effects of international military links can
sometimes, however, be quite the opposite of that
intended by their sponsors. For example, in the
counterinsurgency training organised by Western
powers military intellectuals read and transmit to
their colleagues the doctrine of the 'enemy'Mao,
Guevara, Giap or Fanon. When the military role is
2 For the perceptive analysis of this contradiction within the
mainstream of bourgeois military thought see Janowitz
(1960).
redefined in the direction of domestic repression
rather than external security the contradictions to
which these authors call attention begin to emerge.
Doctrines of 'revolutionary war' politicise officers
both in the direction of the radical right and of the
radical left.
Putting down strikes, demonstrations and guerrilla
uprisings acquaints army officers with the grim
realities of poverty and strife in their own country's
rural areas and urban slums. These are not perceived,
however, in the abstract but from a particular
vantage point in the military hierarchy and class
structure, creating a deep ambivalence. On the one
hand it is feared that the disorder will get out of hand,
and suspected that it is manipulated by international
Communist subversion; and tough-minded new
doctrines of 'national security' develop. On the other,
radicalisation of some sectors of the officer corps
occurs, based on the feeling that domestic repression
is not the job of the army and threatens to destroy it
by bringing it into contact with class conflict. The
Majors who staged the January 1966 coup in Nigeria
and the officers of the Derg in Ethiopia were
alienated by their experience in putting down
strikes; the Peruvian military leaders espoused a
programme of reform in order to deal with the real
social problems they saw as responsible for guerrilla
uprisings and to keep the military institution free of
the taint of domestic repression.
The contradiction between the two variants of
professionalismthat of conventional warfare and
that of counterinsurgencycorresponds to an impor-
tant tension in the class structure of a dependent
social formation. On the one hand the techniques and
organisational blueprints of advanced countries are
transferred to the Third World, interlinked with arms
sales and industrialisation. On the other the armies
and class structures of peripheral countries do not
just become those of the advanced countries writ
small, as they have been profoundly distorted by their
contact with the latter.
Domination at the periphery requires different
relations of force from those in use in the metropolis.
Yet this sometimes conflicts with the vested interests
of professional soldiers in more conventional military
functions. Thus the Peruvian junta which took power
in 1968 at the same time that it increased national
control over the economy also reasserted the
military's role in external defence by buying foreign
military hardware of a kind which the civilian regime
(under US government pressure) had denied the
soldiers.
One may, in conclusion, see two contrapuntal themes
in military professionalism in the Third World: on
the one hand, military nationalism directed towards
the creation of an internationally effective nation-
state supported by a well developed conventional
army, increasingly linked through its arms purchases
to the international economy; on the other,
international pressure for political 'stability' at the
periphery, requiring an internally powerful state
machinery and enlisting military commitment to
doctrines of 'national security' legitimising its role in
internal repression. These themes are interlinked and
contradictory. Both are present in military ideology
and tend to be associated with conflict between
opposed groups of army officers.
Military hierarchy, repression and international
clientage
Power grows out of the barrel of the gun
the gun on the tank
the warhead on the missile
but also out of the shout of the sergeant-major
the pronunciamento of the junta
the whisper in the Pentagon
Weapons are mute unless organised in a framework
of social relations which determine how they are used
and against whom, social relations which can be an-
alysed at at least three levels: the system of command
established within military organisations themselves;
the system of domination established through the
state apparatus; and the struggle for international
power and spheres of influence between nation-states.
Neither their own arms nor their diplomacy are
enough to assure the nation-states of the Third
World of protection from foreign interference or
from the mass destruction of their citizens. They live
in a world in which the techniques of force are
internationalised to such an extent that they pose a
common threat to the entire human race, yet are by
no means under effective international control. This
much the developing countries share in common
with the remainder of the world. But they are further
disadvantaged by the fact that the precarious balance
of power through which some semblance of
international peace is maintained is one which on the
whole reproduces the dominance of the large
industrial powers over the Third World.
In the Third World both army and state were in a
real sense created or restructured by the expansion of
the central capitalist powers. Their military
hierarchies are based on imposed organisational
blueprints. The state machinery as a whole is weak,
narrowly based and as much the artefact of
international as of national domination. And to
shore up its fragile structure the military function is
inverted: the armed forces being more often used to
repress internal dissent than to maintain inter-
national security.
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There is no more eloquent testimony to the
internationalisation of the relations of domination
than the uniformity of certain characteristics of
professional armies: the hierarchy of ranks, the
exclusiveness of the military brotherhood, the
emphasis on rituals and emblems of rank, the codes
of honour, the class distinctions between officers and
other ranks. Part of this can be accounted for by the
fact that a small number of modelsbasically
British, French, German and Americanhave been
consciously transplanted in the Third World. But
where other transplants like the ill-fated 'West-
minster model' of parliamentary democracy did not
take root, military organisations flourished. Organ-
ised force is essential for the reproduction of
modern nation-states, voting is not.
Nevertheless armies are seldom monolithic institu-
tions on which members of ruling classes can always
rely. The use of military force to repress opponents of
the regime or to settle struggles for political power
often moves the conflict into the armed forces
themselves, accentuating their internal contradictions
and precipitating coups, mutinies and power
struggles.
Military violence itself tends to become a major
problem. The memory of the My Lai massacre by
American troops in Vietnamand other massacres
like it which surely took place but went unrecorded-
of French torture in Algeria, of Russian military
repression in Eastern Europe and the present realities
of British military occupation in Northern Ireland
remind one that this problem is by no means
confined to the armies of the developing countries.
The boundary between legitimate military force and
illegitimate violence is always difficult to draw and is
sometimes deliberately obscured both by military
leaders and by members of the ruling classes with
whom they are associated. However strongly denied
internationally, for example, it is clear that there was
military participation (by, among others, the
RPKADthe Army Para-commandos) (Caldwell:
14) in the massacre of PK1 (Indonesian Communist
Party) members and sympathisers in 1965-66; in the
massacres of Ibo civilians in Northern Nigeria in
1966; in the kidnapping and murder of 'subversive
elements' by grupos mihtaros in Argentina, not to
mention similar groups which have at various times
operated in Uruguay, Brazil. Chile, Guatemala,
Uganda, Burundi and no doubt one or two other
countries where they have been less well publicised.
At the very least the military commanders and
governments involved have condoned violence by
failing to take action against it; often they have
tacitly encouraged if not actively ordered it.
Conversely, however, military violence has some-
times been turned against authority: engulfing the
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army command, the government (even if it is a
military government), the ruling class and even in
some extreme instances (Nigeria in 1966-67, or Zaire
in 1960) the entire structure of the State itself.
The majority of the countries of Africa, Asia, the
Middle East and Latin America are under military
rule. Still more of them have experienced military
intervention or periods of military rule at some point
or other during the past 30 years. And if one adopts
broader criteria there are scarcely any where
organised military force has not been used to keep in
office or to change the regime or ruling class during
the past three decades.
Against this background most of the things social
scientists have to say seem exceedingly banal. Much
of the existing literature takes as its starting point the
problem of assuring 'civilian control' over the
military establishment: which can be looked at over a
whole continuum of military participation in
politics, ranging from gentlemanly bargaining over
strategy or appropriations, outright blackmail of the
regime, participation in the reshuffling of ruling
elites right through to direct military control of all
the major political institutions of a society (Finer
1962).
The absence of civilian control is only a 'problem',
however, when contrasted with an idealised view of
the relationship between soldiers and governments in
the advanced bourgeois democracies. It is not an
especially useful way of looking at the political
institutions of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and
Latin America, where military participation rather
than civilian control might be viewed as the 'normal'
state of affairs. Nor does the idea of a continuum
from civilian to military take us very far. To be sure,
the difference between a military establishment which
intervenes as a 'moderating power' to resolve
conflicts between civilian factions as in Brazil before
1964 and one which attempts permanently to
substitute itself for parts of the state superstructure,
to become the State as it were, as in the same country
after 1967, is important. Yet to view this as just a
change from less to more military participation in
political life is superficial, for the military's formal
participation in politics is less important than the
question of how far the state superstructure is or is
not held together by organised coercion. To what
extent do those who control that superstructure rely
on repressive rather than ideological mechanisms to
establish their hegemony?
The distinction between civilian and military regimes
may well be less important than the similarities in the
way they govern. Take a country like the Philippines
where, under a civilian regime civil liberties have been
curtailed, the media browbeaten, trade unions
deprived of the right to strike, opponents of the
regime repressed. There is intensive surveillance by
the police and military intelligence networks, internal
warfare is waged against a dissident minority group,
the military is frequently consulted about major
government decisions, martial law is in operation and
political offences are tried before military rather than
civilian tribunals. The extent of repression and its
methods differ only in detail from that practised in
other Third World countries such as South Korea,
Indonesia, Taiwan, Sri Lanka or Pakistan; Brazil,
Argentina, Peru or Uruguay; Iran, Iraq, Egypt,
Syria or Jordan; Senegal, Ghana, Zaire or Ethiopia;
be they formally under civilian governments or under
the military and whether the regime is of a
conservative or progressive political tendency.
Coups and military regimes are, to be sure, the
prevailing trend in the Third World, and this is
hardly surprising. For when organised coercion is the
main basis of state power, coups are to be expected
merely because more 'democratic' methods of
transferring power between different fractions of the
ruling classes cease to operate. But struggles to gain
or to remain in power can also be waged by
assassination, mob violence, surveillance and terror
by the secret police, bribery and the skilful
dispensation of political patronage. Frequent coups
may betoken instability in the framework of the
Statebut not necessarily more so than votes of no
confidence, reshufflings of cabinets and frequent
elections in bourgeois democracies. Like the latter
they speed the circulation of elites and the
realignment of fractions of the ruling classes more
often than they bring about fundamental change in
the organisation of state power and its allocation
between (rather than within) social classes.
The coup, then, is to some extent a bogus problem.
Rather than improvising explanations of its
occurrence it is better to give attention to different
questions. To what extent do those who control the
state machinery rely on repressive mechanisms-
including army ruleto secure their domination? Is
the increase in coups and military regimes part of a
more general restructuring of power in the periphery
in the direction of greater authoritarianism and less
reliance on ideological controls and popular
participation? If so, what are the reasons for the
change? Which institutions 'ind social classes does
authoritarian government benefit, both nationally
and internationally? How far is it precipitated by the
internationalisation of the capital, power and
military influence of the core capitalist countries?
Does it make things more (or less) difficult for those
who wish to implement reforms like the redistri-
bution of wealth and productive resources or
disarmament? Does it create the conditions under
which such changes can only be effected by
revolutionary change, the smashing of the entire
repressive apparatus of the State? What contra-
dictions exist within that apparatus and how can best
use be made of them against state (and military)
repression?
In Karl Marx's classic analysis of Bonapartism it was
recognised that in periods of acute crisis or of
historical transition between modes of production
members of the ruling class would often be prepared
to accept authoritarian government by a state
machine over which it had relatively little direct
control: the bourgeoisie would sometimes sacrifice its
own class rule in order to secure the political stability
on which the smooth functioning of a capitalist
economy and its own class interests depend.
Bonapartism however is not a magical category into
which the analysis of the military can be hammered.
The historical circumstances of the present-day Third
World bring together a different combination of
elements from that which prevailed in nineteenth
century France. The crisis of hegemony suffered by
ruling classes is permanent and endemic rather than
temporary and exceptional. Uneven development
superimposes all the contradictions between centre
and periphery, capitalist and pre-capitalist social
formations, class and tribe, region, religion and
nation; and makes it all the more difficult for any
single ruling class or fraction thereof to establish its
ideological claims to rule.
Add to this the effects of a colonial situation in which
an alien ruling class had to rely on state repression to
secure its domination. And a process of decoloni-
sation from which there emerged a disjuncture
between the national ruling class on the one hand and
the economically dominant class with its com-
manding heights in the boardrooms of international
firms on the other. This gives the crisis of hegemony a
peculiar neocolonial twist. For it has retarded the
formation of home-grown bourgeoisies and made it
more difficult for the latter to function as effective
ruling classes able through their policies to exert
control over the national economy. But at the same
time it creates a problem for the representatives of
international capital who have to find ways of
influencing policy and the political structure in
peripheral countries, despite their inability to act
directly as a fraction of the ruling class.
On the face of it the military seems to meet the
political requirements of international capital under
these troubled circumstances almost better than any
other institution. A powerful, relatively autonomous
state apparatusbuttressed by military coercion-
provides a framework of stability and predictnbility
within which it is relatively easier for multinational
capital to operate. Further, the fact that the military
usually depends for its weapons purchases on
international purchasing power earned in the world
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market and appropriated through the State tends to
cement the alliance with international capital. In the
same measure that external penetration weakens the
class structure, it increasesthrough arms supplies,
military assistance, and political supportthe
military establishment's size, claims on productive
resources and autonomy relative to other fractions of
the ruling class.
Yet to postulate in these general terms that the
military appears to fit the political requirements of
international capitalstability and a solution to the
problems created by international capital's inability
to act directly as a ruling classdoes not mean that
in any given country it will in fact carry out these
functions; or do so in a uniform way from one
country to another. To begin with, the military and
military regimes are hardly ever in a simple sense the
political servants of international capital or of great
power governments. It would be quite grotesque to
label Colonel Gaddafy of Libya, Lt. Colonel Haue
Meriam of Ethiopia, the members of the Peruvian
junta or indeed General Idi Amin as the agents of
imperialism. Even the most reactionary Latin
American regimes have a degree of autonomy:
witness for example the edifying spectacle of the
governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador
and Uruguay threatening to turn elsewhere for arms
and military assistance if President Carter continues
to cut back aid to countries with a record of
violation of human rights.
Indeed, the military's own institutional and material
interests lie in the direction of a strong nation-state
with control over the surpluses generated in the
national economy. This determines the class project
carried out by the military in two main ways. First,
through the compact established between the State
and international capital in which the military has a
direct interest as a state institution and an indirect
interest through its linkages with the international
arms economy. Second, through the role of organised
force in resolvingor rather in repressing the
symptoms ofthe crises generated under different
conditions of dependent capitalist development.
Accordingly, in Table I, I attempt to show how
different patterns of incorporation in the world
economy shape the varying class projects of the
military establishment. The first two patterns set
forth in the Table arise in economies which are based
on the production of raw materials for the world
market, though it makes a considerable difference
whether these are produced (like many agricultural
commodities) by numerous indigenous petty pro-
ducers; or are extracted (like most minerals) through
large investments of foreign capital. The third and
fourth patterns are determined by the nature of a
country's process of industrialisation- -whether by
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import-substitution or by the export of cheap
manufactures produced by lowcost labour.
Armies and military regimes are seldom directly
subservient to foreign capital. Even in countries
whose economies are based on primary products
extracted and sold abroad by foreign corporations,
they often take up natural resource ideologies
(Fortin); and favour state expropriation of foreign
capital to the extent this can be achieved (as by the
oil producers) without serious damage to the
economy's international earning power. In in-
dustrialising countries the same factors incline the
military towards state investment and regulation of
the economy. Such regulation need not interfere with
the compact established with international capital
and may indeed create a new, more organic symbiosis
between the State and multinational corporations.
Even when the major means of production are no
longer in foreign hands militarism and state
capitalism together may still reinforce the integration
of the national economy and its class structure in the
circuits of the international economy: because
foreign exchange still has to be earned to pay for
armaments, technology and the expansion of the
state and military bureaucracy.
Few countries fit fair and square into any one of the
categories in the Table. Indeed, the military often
plays a critical role in the transition from one pattern
to another. The crisis which led first to the rise to
power of the Allende regime in Chile and then to its
overthrow by the soldiers in 1974 was, for example,
brought on by the exhaustion of the process of
import-substitution and the international forces set
in motion by the government's expropriation of the
foreign copper monopolies. In response to these
external forces the military government has adopted
economic policieseconomic liberalisation, sale of
state enterprises, the curtailment of import-
substitution, withdrawal from the Andean Pact
which virtually amount to a reassertion of its
traditional position in the international division of
labour as a raw material producer.
Further, it is not necessary to assume that the class
project the military finally takes up is necessarily
agreed in advance or even understood by the officer
corps, still less their men, nor that it will be stable.
Periods of crisis bring major shifts in tbe way the
military interposes itself in class conflict, which are
usually accompanied by violent internal struggles.
The social origins of the soldiers who win such
struggles, their civilian allies and their original
intentions will have some influence on the class
project the military undertakes, but may be distorted
by the circumstances with which they have to cope
once they take power. Examples are not difficult to
find: the Nigerian army intervened to establish
national unity in 1966 but broke up into tribal and
regional factions six months later; the Chilean
military seized power with the active support of the
national bourgeoisie in order to halt what was
perceived as a process of national disintegration, and
ended up restoring the dominance of foreign
monopoly capital; the soldiers who took power in
Brazil in 1964 quickly dropped their programme of
economic and political liberalisation in favour of
state-sponsored industrialisation under an authori-
tarian regime.
Although the crises of dependent capitalist develop-
ment provoke military repression, this repression
does not necessarily establish political order.
Sometimes the military's weapons have simply
turned conflict into more bloody conflict: witness,
for example, the effects of military violence in
Uruguay, in Bangladesh just before its war of
liberation from Pakistan or indeed in Northern
Ireland. Or the military itself has become deeply
dividedas in Nigeria and the Lebanon before and
during their respective civil warsand thus unable to
stand above the conflict. Nevertheless the fact that
military force settles things in the last resort is
critical, particularly in societies in permanent crisis,
where the last resort is always close at hand.
Not can one automatically assume that the military
will intervene in these crises as the compliant ally of
the dominant classes. Its internal fissures, as we have
already seen, may create radical as well as
reactionary tendencies both in the officer corps and
among ordinary soldiers. On a number of occasions
the military establishment has sided with the
periphery against the centreas in some African
states where the recruitment base of the army has
traditionally been in the less developed parts of the
countryor with labour in its struggles with capital
as in the alliance between sections of the army and
organised labour in Peronist Argentina in the 1940s.
Yet although particular fractions of the military elite
may intervene on behalf of peripheral or excluded
classes and groups in times of crisis, the military
establishment as a whole has a vested interest in what
military ideologists call 'national security' and what
its opponents call state and class domination.
The natural response of professional soldiers is to
suppress class struggle when it appears because it
divides the nation, undermines the international
economic standing of the economycausing flights
of foreign capitaland imposes certain real costs-
casualties, disruption of routine, threats to its
structure and its monopoly of organised forceupon
the military establishment itself.
Let us turn, therefore to the interrelation between the
international system and armed force. This can be
analysed at a number of levels. In the first place a
world in which conflict is endemic and force governs
the relations between nation states enhances the
influence of military organisations. More than 30
years ago Harold Lasswell (1941) suggested that
growing international conflict would increasingly
turn the world powers into "garrison states" in which
the influence of military managers of violence would
predominate: though he omitted to say that this
conflict can sometimes itself be the consequence of
the influence of these military managers in whose
interests it is to exaggerate threats to security.
International insecurity contributes equally much to
military influence at the periphery. The armed forces
are large and influential in most countries at the edge
of the cold war, like Greece, Turkey, Iran, Thailand
and South Korea; and also in countries at the nodes
of regional conflict as in the Middle East and the
Horn of Africa. Military coups have frequently swept
aside civilian governments which have failed (in the
soldiers' view) to provide adequately for their
country's security: for example the overthrow of the
Egyptian monarchy by the Free Officers after
humiliating defeats suffered at the hands of Israel; or
the 1969 coup in Somalia which swept aside a
civilian government which had pursued the border
conflict with Ethiopia with less enthusiasm than the
soldiers desired. Soldiers are also quick to react to the
international aspects of internal struggles. For
example the contagion effects between military coups,
such as those which swept through west and central
Africa in 1965-66. Or the spread of military garrison
states in Latin America in the 1960s and l970s;
responding on the one hand to the establishment of
socialism in Cuba and the spread of revolutionary
movements across national boundaries; and on the
other to the transnationalisation of American
counterinsurgency training and doctrine.
As with military intervention in the internal politics
of a country, so too there is a whole continuum of
external intervention: from diplomatic pressure,
economic aid and military assistance programmes;
various forms of blackmail such as threats to
withdraw economic and military assistance; covert
subversion and the destabilisation of regimes in the
style of the CIA or KGB; reassurances of recognition
and support to coup-makers if successful; actual
material support for a coup, or altermtively support
in putting one down; military assistance and advice
in counter-revolutionary operations; taking direct
part in such operations (the US in the early stages of
the Vietnam conflict); direct participation in a
revolutionary war (the Chinese in Korea or the
Cubans in Angola); through to actual invasion by
troops of the intervening power (the US in the
Dominican Republic and in Vietnam, or France and
Britain in the Suez Crisis).
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Yet one cannot measure the effect of external
pressures on the military, the class structure or the
political system as a whole solely by the level to
which overt foreign interference has actually been
pushed. In some countries, like Chile, intervention
may have taken place precisely because the
contradictions are sharper than elsewhere and the
hegemony of imperialist powers less secure. In others
the class structure and internal political forces may be
self-sustaining and direct intervention unnecessary.
The arms trade and discreet military assistance
programmes are often all that is required to keep the
professional military establishment in operation and
the stability of the political system within tolerable
limits. And in others again, like Iran, Indonesia or
Zaire external penetration may be massive but
multifaceted, so that to take one aspect alone such as
support for a coup, covert CIA activities, foreign aid
and investment, military assistance, or diplomatic
pressure, may give an incomplete picture of foreign
influence because all are important together.
Conversely, however, direct intervention has some-
times created more contradictions than those it
represses. The Suez crisis, the American intervention
in Vietnam and the South African invasion of Angola
are perhaps the most glaring examples, but there are
several others. Failure to examine abortive as well as
successful interventions might lead one to under-
estimate the limits imperialism faces, the contra-
dictions it creates for itself and the strength of the
forces opposed to it on the periphery. These limits
arise at a number of different levels.
First, the strength and disposition of anti-imperialist
forces themselves: in Vietnam for example, the
military effectiveness of the liberation armies and the
presence of the Russian nuclear deterrent to
discourage escalation of the conflict by the
Americans; in Angola the extremely prompt and
effective assistance provided by the Cubans and
Russians and the reluctance of the USA to risk a
diplomatic showdown in Africa by openly inter-
vening.
Second, differences among the major Western
powers, as during the Suez crisis, when the
disapproval of the Americans and their refusal to
support British borrowing from the IMF to halt the
run on the pound caused by the crisis, brought the
Anglo-French invasion of Egypt to a grinding halt.
Third the internal contradictions by which im-
perialist powers are sometimes weakened: the bitter
opposition to the Suez invasion by the Labour
Party; or the economic burden of arms spending by
the US government in Vietnam and the gathering
strength of the anti-war movement. There are strong
pressures impelling the major capitalist powers to
intervene in their interests at the periphery. But it
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would be a mistake to regard them as monolithic and
to underestimate the constraints according to which
they operate.
Intervention, furthermore, is not exclusive to
capitalist powers but has also been an integral part of
the struggle against them. External support has been
a crucial element in most contemporary revolutions:
Russian support (however grudging) for the Chinese
revolution; Russian and Chinese assistance in
Vietnam; Arab and communist bloc help to the
Algerians in their war of national liberation from
France; the assistance of the Russians and Chinese
and of neighbouring African countries to the armed
struggle in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.
Nevertheless such assistance is not without its own
contradictions. External aid cannot overcome
unfavourable objective conditions; witness for
example the failure of Che Guevara to bring
revolution to Bolivia. It all too easily triggers off
nationalist responses and accusations of 'social
imperialism' against the donor: visible already, for
instance, in the ambivalence of the Angolans about
the continued presence in their country of their
Cuban and Russian liberators. Recipients of socialist
assistancehowever worthy according to revolu-
tionary criteriaare vulnerable to changes in the
interests of the donors. The revolutions in Laos and
Cambodia were delayed because the Vietnamese gave
and withdrew assistance in accordance with the
progress of their own struggle. Socialist rivalriesfor
example Chinese support for the FNLA and Cuban
and Soviet for the MPLA in Angolahave
sometimes helped to create divisions in liberation
movements.
In a very real sense the intervention of socialist
countries is also limited and shaped by the
constraints of balance of power politics. In several
Latin American countries the Moscow-controlled
communist parties have been ambivalent toward
armed struggle: fluctuating between support for
insurrection and for more 'legitimate' activity in
accord with the turns and swings of international
politics. The support of socialist countries for the
revolutions in former Portuguese Africa was covert
and limited in quantity until the international
political conjuncture became favourable to larger-
scale involvement after the invasion of Angola by
South Africa.
Despite the expansion of capital on a world scale
there is little semblance of an international
superstructure, comparable to the national state.
There are instead only partial international
superstructures; some based on region (the EEC,
ASEAN etc); some constituting military alliances
between states (NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the
moribund SEATO and CENTO) and some with
specialised functions (the UN agencies, IMF, World
Bank etc.). These do relatively little to bind the world
system together. Indeed military alliances and
regional pacts on the whole deepen the main
fractures between blocs.
Rather than superstructure it might be more apposite
to talk of a 'superstruggle': but for the integrating
mechanisms of both of the international economy,
which incorporates enterprises and states alike in the
circuits of capital, and of balance of power politics
which (at least for the time being) prevents the war of
all against all.
Although most statesmen and military leaders
subscribe to the concept of a balance of powerand
thus make it take on the character of self-fulfilling
prophecyit is thoroughly ambiguous. The nature of
the nuclear means of mass destruction on which the
balance between the central world powers is based is
such that balances computed merely in terms of the
numbers of missiles, aircraft and nuclear warheads
available to each side make little sense. Further, the
very ability to participate depends on a very advanced
technology and industrial base. The balance thus
expresses the competing interests of the ruling classes
of advanced industrial countries and the clientage of
those of the Third World.
And, further, a balance between societies with
diverse modes of production is by no means a
balance of equivalents. For its equilibrium is
constantly disturbed by the contradictory pressures
of capitalist and of socialist expansion towards the
periphery. The Russians and Cubans, for example,
have made it clear that detente does not in principle
exclude assistance to wars of national liberation.
Western governments too consider that interventions
on behalf of capital are permissible, however much
they may protest against socialist interventions. The
main constraint is what each side thinks it can get
away within terms both of international power
politics and of domestic support for its policies from
one period to another.
Such an international system does not even succeed
in providing a political basis for the orderly
expansion of capital on an international level; the
tools of international economic management having
proved woefully inadequate to deal with the current
international economic crisis. Still less does it
provide a reasonable prospect of peace and of a more
just distribution of resources internationally. All the
available evidence suggests that arms races will
continue, even though in some measure limited by
SALT and other such agreements.
Balance of power politics, furthermore, provides only
temporary and largely inadequate solutions to the
international crises which beset the Third World.
Typically, it is devoted to stabilising the existing
situation without getting to grips with the substantive
issues, the very real contradictions which underlie
conflicts such as the Middle East crisis or the wars of
national liberation in Southern Africa.
From a revolutionary point of view struggles for class
and national liberation take precedence over
international stability for its own sake. Would
Vietnam have been liberated by international
negotiation? Does it make sense to negotiate over
majority rule in Rhodesia, still less in South Africa
without a credible threat of revolutionary violence to
speed the negotiations along? Can the Middle East
conflict be resolved without a just solution for the
problem of the Palestine? And do the Palestinians
have any way of securing international attention
except by hijacking, bombing and raiding?
The very severity of the present international crisis in
some ways, however, provides favourable oppor-
tunities for the modification or destruction of
existing relations of international domination: a
nuclear stalemate in which great powers can be
played off against each other; internal dissent within
the large capitalist powers which makes it more
difficult for their governments to pursue expansionist
foreign policies; economic crisis which fuels this
discontent inside capitalist countries, and, further,
makes it difficult for them to finance external
military ventures or to subsidise arms sales in order to
gain political influence. The same crisis also bringing
things to a head in the periphery, concentrating
economic grievances and mobilising popular forces
(but also increasing the repression by dominant
classes).
Yet these opportunities involve very grave dangers
both for those who take advantage of them and for
the international community as a whole. Would a
major escalation of the conflict in Southern Africa
with heavy Cuban and Soviet support for the
revolutionary forces be worth the risk of a major
international conflagration? What is the risk of the
Arabs and Israel using the missiles they both now
possess against each others' cities? What will happen
to international relations if attempts to control
nuclear proliferation fail, and countries like Vietnam
and Cuba on the one hand and Brazil and India on
the other deploy their own nuclear warheads? What
likelihood is there that a revolutionary group like the
Tupamaros or the Black September could actually
acquire their own nuclear arsenal? Andsupposing
one sympathised with their broad aimshow would
one balance the prospective gains from nuclear
blackmail against the enormous risks for all
concerned, including possible retaliation in kind by
neo-fascist groups or by Israel respectively.
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This is a real dilemma for those who wish to change
the existing pattern of international dominatIon. On
the one hand increasingly dangerous forms of armed
struggle and international conflict. And on the other
the severe limits of negotiated settlements which start
from the existing distribution of power. For the
latter have enormous obstacles to overcome in the
vested interests crystallised around existing nation
states and military organisations; in the international
division of labour and patterns of international
capital accumulation; in the international arms
economy, and in the very complexity of the issues at
stake in international conflict. To the extent that
attempts to stabilise the existing pattern of
international arrangements merely buy time, in
which lines of conflict harden and the international
production and diffusion of destructive weapons
continues, they may actually increase the ultimate
danger. Weapons and military organisationsthe
means of forceare in the international domain, in
that their deployment and or use is a matter of
common danger and common social concern for all
mankind. Yet they are still appropriated and
controlled by national ruling classes which use or
threaten to use them to reproduce their national
power and international interests. This makes social
control over their use and conditions of lasting peace
almost impossible to bring about without major
transformation in the structures of international
production, power and force. But the risks of the
struggle to bring about such transformation are
great and impose heavy responsibilities on those
who undertake it.
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